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I. INTRODUCTION
As of today, no federal or state case and no piece of published
scholarship in this country has mentioned the words "Title VII" and
"transferred intent" in the same sentence. Their near mutually exclusive
relationship in the legal sphere is understandable because the principle of
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transferred intent,1 which has its genesis in tort and criminal law, has never
been seen as factoring into Title VII workplace discrimination
jurisprudence. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination "because of. . . [an] individual's" protected class status,
meaning his or her race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. The
statute's plain language seems to require that the cause of one's
discrimination be one's own protected class status. But what about an
employment decision informed only by concern for who is not going to be
benefited amidst a group and the protected classes that may be excluded
from advancement?
In the recent case of Ricci v. DeStefano,3 the Supreme Court might
have officially opened the door to what may be called "transferred intent"
jurisprudence under Title VII. The Court did so by assuming that the city
of New Haven's refusal to certify the results of a promotion examination
that appeared to disproportionately screen out members of minority groups,
like African Americans and Hispanics, amounted, presumptively, to
deliberate disparate treatment discrimination against all plaintiffs that
sought to have the results certified.4  The Court made this supposition
irrespective of the plaintiffs' individual races or whether their individual
races were taken into account.5 However, not all of the plaintiff class was
6Caucasian; one was a Hispanic firefighter. Consequently, the Court
permitted a plaintiff to recover under Title VII whose race, according to the
Court, was not considered in and did not motivate the adverse employment
decision at all.7
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the Caucasian plaintiffs' race
was the basis of the decision. It is possible that the City decision makers
did not take their race into account at all, except insofar as the decision
makers noted that there were not enough members of minority groups
among them.
By taking this approach in Ricci, the Supreme Court appears to have
resolved a split among lower courts that spanned decades as to the proper
reach of Title VII, albeit tacitly, and seemingly unwittingly. The
1. Transferred intent is "[t]he rule that if one person intends to harm a second person but
instead unintentionally harms a third, the first person's criminal or tortious intent toward the
second applies to the third as well." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (8th ed. 2004).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
3. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
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ramifications of this decision are likely to be far-reaching, and may even
have been unintended by the Court, which held that the city of New Haven,
Connecticut violated Title VII when it refused to certify the results of a
8promotional exam given to firefighters. The refusal to certify occurred
after the City learned that Caucasian test takers had outperformed minority
test takers to such an extent that it feared a disparate impact lawsuit brought
by the minority firefighters if it did not discard the test results.
9
Under a "transferred intent" theory of Title VII, one who is adversely
affected by a decision that is "race-conscious," or made with race in mind,
may prove intentional disparate treatment under Title VII, even if her race
was not considered at all or was consciously disregarded in the decision
making process. While this result appears to contravene the language of the
statute which focuses on the protected status of the plaintiff, it may be
compelled or at least authorized by Ricci's holding and language. To the
extent that lower courts have looked at cases like Ricci-in which plaintiffs
are adversely affected by discrimination but are not discriminated against
because of their protected class status-and come to different and disparate
conclusions, Ricci might well have resolved the split without recognizing
that it had done so or other implications of the decision.
The issue of whether or not so-called "transferred intent" is
discernible in this case is somewhat unclear. The Supreme Court's holding
was ultimately that the city's sentiment that "'too many whites and not
enough minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified[,]'
[w]ithout some other justification ...violates Title VII's command that
employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an
individual's race."10 As long as the city considered this Hispanic firefighter
to be a member of a minority group, it would have had to take the action it
took with respect to this plaintiff in spite of his race, rather than because of
it.
In evaluating the Ricci holding and developing the theory of
transferred intent within Title VII, this Article first discusses Title VII
discrimination and disparate impact law generally in Part II. Next, it
delineates the facts and analysis of Ricci in Parts III and IV. Part V
illustrates the ways in which Ricci supports a transferred intent theory under
Title VII and discusses how Ricci may have inadvertently resolved a circuit
split. Finally, Part VI ends the Article with a recapitulation of Ricci's
implications.
8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
9. Id. at 2664.
10. Id. at 2673 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd,
530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)).
2009]
Loyola Law Review
II. TITLE VII, DISPARATE TREATMENT, AND DISPARATE
IMPACT
It is illegal for an employer to intentionally treat an employee in a
discriminatory manner because of the employee's protected class status.
Similarly, it is illegal for an employer to engage in an employment practice
that confers a disproportionate harm or disadvantage to members of a
protected class unless that practice is a business necessity and capable of
being accomplished through no less restrictive means. The Supreme Court
construed Ricci as an invitation to answer the question of how courts should
negotiate a situation in which an employer has purportedly engaged in the
deliberate disparate treatment of employees in order to stave off liability for
a practice which could confer an illegal disparate impact on a protected
class. A brief discussion of the causes of action and frameworks implicated
is thus in order.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
"fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or
otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'"I Originally,
the legislation spoke only to intentional disparate treatment of employees
because of their protected status. The law, however, evolved in the decades
following its passage when the Court recognized that an employer could
discriminate against its employees, either intentionally or unintentionally,
by imposing upon them a facially neutral policy or practice that had a
disparate impact on members of a protected class. 12
A disparate treatment cause of action arises when an employer "treat[s
a] particular person less favorably than others because of" his or her
protected class status. 13 To succeed in a claim of disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must show the defendant's "discriminatory intent or motive" for
taking a job-related action.' 4 However, following the landmark Supreme
Court case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' a plaintiff may also make out a
cause of action where he or she has lost an employment opportunity as the
result of an employer policy or practice that has a disparate impact upon the
protected class to which he or she belongs. ' 6 This cause of action will arise
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
12. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988).
14. Id. at 986.
15. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
16. Id. at 436 (Through its passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress has commanded
that any employee testing procedure used "must measure the person for the job and not the person
[Vol. 55
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even when the employer did not intend to discriminate.
7
In Griggs, African American workers were being disproportionately
screened out of employment opportunities vis-A-vis their Caucasian
counterparts. Their employer required that applicants and employees who
sought to transfer jobs have a high school diploma and pass a "standardized
general intelligence test" which the Court found had no "demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.,
1 8
The Court pointed out that "the jobs in question formerly had been filled
only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving
preference to whites.
Emphasizing that Congress's clear intent in enacting Title VII was "to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees," the Griggs Court observed that "practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices. 2 °  The Court thus held that Title VII proscribes
certain employment practices, including those effectuated without
discriminatory intent. This unintentional discrimination occurs where
employment practices function as "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers" that "operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of [an]
,21impermissible classification." In other words, "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation., 22  Moreover, to the extent that an employer felt that a
challenged practice was relevant to job success, the Court noted that as per
Congress's mandate, the employer must show the requirement's "manifest
relationship to the employment. ,23
In 1988, seventeen years after Griggs, the Court continued to shape
the disparate impact cause of action in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust. In Watson, the Court noted that the more "obvious" examples of
in the abstract.").
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
18. Id. at 425-26, 431.
19. Id. at 426.
20. Id. at 429-30.
21. Id. at 431.
22. Id. at 432.
23. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Supreme Court departed from Griggs's construction of the
disparate impact claim in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Congress
swiftly responded to Ward's Cove by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which re-instituted
the business necessity defense as set forth in Griggs.
24. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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disparate impact that courts had evaluated occurred "where facially neutral
job requirements necessarily operated to perpetuate the effects of
intentional discrimination that occurred before Title VII was enacted. 25
However, cognizable claims also exist where "some facially neutral
employment practices ...violate[d) Title VII even in the absence of a
demonstrated discriminatory intent." 6 The Court refused to confine valid
claims to those "in which the challenged practice served to perpetuate the
effects of pre-Act intentional discrimination," and noted that each of the
disparate impact cases it had previously decided involved "standardized
employment tests or criteria.,
27
In Watson, however, the Court held for the first time that a disparate
impact analysis was applicable in instances where employment decisions
were premised upon "subjective" criteria, such as interviews and other
28forms of non-standardized evaluation. The Court noted that,
notwithstanding the fact that subjective decision-makers can always act
with express, invidious prejudice, they can also-in some cases-still be
guided by, among other things, "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices"
29despite not harboring a conscious, demonstrable discriminatory intent.
Thus, according to the Court, "[i]f an employer's undisciplined system of
subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system
pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see
why Title VII's proscription against discriminatory actions should not
apply.,
30
Three years after Watson, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991, codifying the disparate impact cause of action and setting forth the
premise that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination where she shows, typically through statistical means, that her
employer has used "a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."3  The
25. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
26. Id. at 988.
27. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); N.Y City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (rule against employing drug addicts); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (written test of verbal skills); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
(written aptitude tests)).
28. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 990-91.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). The Supreme Court, in a departure from the
disparate impact framework crafted in Griggs, endeavored to expand the business necessity
defense afforded in the disparate impact analysis in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989). Congress passed the 1991 Act to abrogate the Wards Cove definition of business
[Vol. 55
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employer is then able to avoid liability if it can demonstrate that the
challenged practice is "job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. ' 32 Nevertheless, the plaintiff will still
prevail if he or she can show that other tests or selection protocols could
serve the employer's interest absent the discriminatory effect in practice.33
Not only were both the disparate impact and disparate treatment
causes of action significant in Ricci; their complex interplay was also at
issue. Essentially, the Court confronted a scenario in which a potential
defendant acted to avoid disparate impact liability to African Americans
and found itself in court defending against a disparate treatment claim by
Caucasians. The Supreme Court was ultimately called upon to craft a
standard for permissible, legal attempts to avert disparate impact liability by
engaging in disparate class-based treatment, and to hold the city of New
Haven up against that standard to see whether it had been met.
III. RICCI FACTS
The plaintiffs in the case, Caucasian and Hispanic firefighters, sued
the city of New Haven (City) and certain named city officials, alleging that
they had been the victims of disparate treatment on the basis of race in
contravention of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 The defendants protested that had the City
certified the results of the examination, it would have been potentially liable
for a Title VII violation against minority firefighters under a theory of
disparate impact.35
In 2003, one hundred eighteen New Haven firefighters sat for an exam
36
to qualify them for promotions within the department. As the Supreme
Court recognized, "the stakes were high," because the City did not
administer promotion examinations often, and both the identities and order
of candidates for promotion over the subsequent two years would be
necessity and to codify the pre-Wards Cove jurisprudence by clarifying that "[t]he terms 'business
necessity' and 'job related' [as used in the Act] are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co .... and in the other Supreme Court decisions
prior to Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio ...." 137 CONG. REC. S 15273 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
33. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
34. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2671 (2009).
35. Id. Thus, the defendants believed that because they were attempting to comply with Title
VII's protection against disparate impact, they could not be held liable under a Title VII disparate
treatment claim.
36. Id. at 2664.
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determined by the results of the exam.37 Those who sat for the exam often
invested much in the way of time, money, and other resources intoS38
preparation. Pursuant to the City's contract with the New Haven
firefighters' union, "applicants for lieutenant and captain positions were to
be screened using written and oral examinations, with the written exam
accounting for 60 percent and the oral exam 40 percent of an applicant's
total score.",39 The City spent $100,000 to retain Industrial/Organizational
Solutions, Inc. (IOS) to design and give a written examination that would
40
assess test-takers' job-related knowledge, as well as oral examinations.
IOS developed the written and oral tests "based on the job-analysis results,
to test most heavily those qualities that the results indicated were 'critica[l]
or essential[l],"' while drawing "material for each test question directly
from the approved source materials," and employing "third-party reviewers
[who] had scrutinized the examinations to ensure that the written test was
drawn from the source material and that the oral test accurately tested real-
world situations that captains and lieutenants would face., 41 The City made
sure that the oral-examination panelists who had been chosen by lOS
formed three-member assessment panels such that each panel included one
Caucasian, one African American, and one Hispanic panelist.42 The exam
was given after a three-month "study period," during which candidates forS43
the exam could consult with specified source materials.
The results of the test showed that of the 77 candidates who took the
lieutenant examination (43 Caucasians, 19 African Americans, and 15
Hispanics), 34 candidates passed, of whom 25 were Caucasian, 6 were
African American, and 3 were Hispanic.44 Based upon the City's governing
promotion structure and the number of extant vacancies, the top ten exam
candidates, all of whom were Caucasian, were eligible for immediate
promotion to the position of lieutenant.45 As for the captain's examination,
41 people sat for the exam-25 of whom were Caucasian, 8 of whom were
46African American, and 8 of whom were Hispanic. Of the 41 people who
sat for the captain's exam, only 22 passed-16 of whom were Caucasian, 3
37. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
38. Id. at 2676.
39. Id. at 2665.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2668.
42. Id.
43. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666. The source material list that the City gave to each candidate
"includ[ed] the specific chapters from which the questions were taken." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. As the Court noted, "[slubsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black
candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant." Id.
46. Id.
[Vol. 55
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47
of whom were African American, and 3 of whom were Hispanic.
Pursuant to the City's governing promotion structure, 9 candidates were in
line for an immediate promotion to the position of captain, 7 of whom were
Caucasian and 2 of whom were Hispanic.48
In the wake of the release of the examination results, New Haven
officials voiced their concern that the exams had operated to discriminate
against the minority candidates who sat for it;49 others countered that there
were explanations for the disparity in the results and that nothing about the
tests or the City's actions were violative of anyone's rights or any statute.50
A rancorous debate ensued among the officials, the firefighters, themselves,
and the public over the proposed certification of the results, with City
officials arguing now that the City might be liable for a disparate impact
created by the examinations, in contravention of Title VII.5 1 As the Court
recited, while some criticized the exam questions as, among other things,
antiquated or irrelevant to the needs of firefighting in New Haven, Frank
Ricci, a Caucasian firefighter who became the named plaintiff in this case,
spoke out in favor of certifying the exam results, stating that the questions
on the exams "were based on the Department's own rules and procedures
and on 'nationally recognized' materials that represented the 'accepted
standards' for firefighting. 52  Additionally, Ricci stated "that he had
'several learning disabilities,' including dyslexia; that he had spent more
than $1,000 to purchase the materials and pay his neighbor to read them on
tape so he could 'give it [his] best shot'; and that he had studied '8 to 13
hours a day to prepare,"' noting that while he didn't "even know if [he]
made it," it should nonetheless be the case that "the people who passed
47. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
48. Id.
49. Id. Some members of the New Haven Civil Service Board and City Council believed that
the exam outcome was a blatant demonstration of disparate impact. Id.
50. Id. The leader of the lOS team that developed and administered the tests felt that the
examination was fair, and stated that "any numerical disparity between white and minority
candidates was likely due to various external factors and was in line with results of the
Department's previous promotional examinations." Id. Janet Helms, a Boston College professor,
whose expertise is in "race and culture as they influence performance on tests and other
assessment procedures" testified that the exam results should not be reconsidered, stating that
'regardless of what kind of written test we give in this country... we can just about predict how
many people will pass who are members of under-represented groups. And your data are not that
inconsistent with what predictions would say were the case."' Id. at 2669. Moreover, Helms
stated that regardless of what kind of exam the City had given to the candidates, there would have
been "'a disparity between blacks and whites, Hispanics and whites,' particularly on a written
test." Id.
51. Id. at 2666-71.
52. Id. at 2667. It bears noting that at the time of his statements in favor of certifying the
exam results, Ricci did not know whether he had passed or failed the exam. Id.
2009]
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should be promoted," because "[w]hen your life's on the line, second best
may not be good enough.,
53
Members of the community, however, asked the City to discard the
examination results, including a representative of the International
Association of Black Professional Firefighters, who described them as
"inherently unfair." 54  A series of meetings, hearings, and information
gathering followed. 55 The City ultimately decided not to certify the results
56
of the examinations, and it, along with several City officials, was sued by
eighteen plaintiffs, seventeen of whom were Caucasian and one of whom
was Hispanic, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The defendants had been presented with an impossible choice: they were
forced to choose between taking an action-certification-that could result
in a disparate impact lawsuit brought by the minority firefighters and
another action--discarding the results-that could, and did, result in a
lawsuit brought by those who had done well enough to be promoted, for
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. 58
The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, 59 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in a
per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of
53. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2667-71. The New Haven Civil Service Board met five times shortly after the exam
to discuss whether the results should be certified or discarded. See id. Each meeting included
experts and witnesses, as well as many of the firefighters from both sides who attended to voice
their opinions on the matter. See id.
56. The Civil Service Board vote on whether to certify the examination scores resulted in a 2-2
tie (after one member removed himself from the vote), which led to a decision to not do so. Id. at
2671.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2664.
59. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn.
2006), aff-d, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)). The District
Court stated that the respondents' "motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a
racially disparate impact ... does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent," and
that the City's decision to not certify the results was not "based on race" because "all applicants
took the same test, and the result was the same for all because the test results were discarded and
nobody was promoted." Id. at 2671 (citing Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006),
aff'd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)).
60. Id. at 2672 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129
S. Ct. 2658 (2009)). The Court of Appeals affirmed using the same rationale as the District Court.
Id. Compare Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (district court opinion), with Ricci, 530 F.3d 87 (Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion). Now-Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor was, at the
time, on the panel of judges that heard the case. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87
(2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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Appeals, finding that there had been disparate treatment of the plaintiffs in
contravention of Title VII.6"
The Supreme Court held that the defendants had indeed violated Title
62VII by intentionally discriminating against the plaintiffs. Specifically, the
Court found that "race-based action like the City's in this case is
impermissible under Title VII [and] unless the employer can demonstrate a
strong basis in evidence that had it not taken the action, it would have been
liable under the disparate-impact statute. 63 Moreover, the Court found that
the defendants failed to meet the newly-announced strong basis in evidence
test, and it elaborated upon the reasons for this conclusion.64 Notably, the
Court determined as a matter of law that the strong basis in evidence test65
had not been met, based upon the record before it. It did not simply
remand the case to a lower court for factual determinations and resolutions,
as one might have expected it to when engaging with such a fact-specific
query.
IV. RICCI ANALYSIS
The Court acknowledged that it would be negotiating the competing
interests of abjuring from engaging in intentional disparate treatment
against one class of individuals while simultaneously guarding against
having a disparate impact on another group. Interestingly, it began its
analysis as follows:
Our analysis begins with this premise: The City's actions would
violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some
valid defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to
certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based
on race-i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared
to white candidates. As the District Court put it, the City rejected the
test results because "too many whites and not enough minorities would
be promoted were the lists to be certified." Without some other
justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title
VII's command that employers cannot take adverse employment
61. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
62. Id. at 2664.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Court declined to address whether defendants' actions violated the Equal
Protection Clause as the issue was rendered moot by its conclusion that the City's actions violated
Title VII. Id. at 2664, 2676.
65. Id. at 2681 (stating that "there (was] no evidence - let alone the required strong basis in
evidence - that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or because other, equally
valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the City").
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actions because of an individual's race.66
The Court went on to reject the possibility that the decision not to
certify the examination results was immunized from disparate treatment
liability by the City's desire to avert disparate impact liability. It noted that
notwithstanding the fact that the City's objectives and intentions might have
been benign or even good, "the City made its employment decision because
of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring
candidates were white.'"67 The issue was, then, whether the City could in
any way justify its race-based discrimination, and not whether that
68discrimination existed in the first place.
The Court rejected the City's purported good faith as a defense. It
ultimately held that a stricter standard was needed because permitting the
City's good faith efforts to avoid disparate impact liability to serve as a
defense to disparate treatment liability "would encourage race-based action
at the slightest hint of disparate impact., 69 The Court held that "under Title
VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate
impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will
be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious,
discriminatory action."
70
As the Court explained, the newly-announced strong-basis-in-
evidence standard gives effect to both the disparate treatment and the
disparate impact provisions that the law had read into the statutory
language.7' The standard gives effect to the disparate treatment and
disparate impact provisions by permitting a defendant to engage in
disparate treatment to stave off a charge of disparate impact discrimination
72in limited circumstances only. It also allows for employers' voluntary
efforts to comply with the statute, which, as the Court pointed out, are
crucial to the attainment of Congress's goals in passing the statute: the
elimination of workplace discrimination and the inclusion of those
historically excluded from the workplace due to protected class
membership. 73  Additionally, the Court noted that the strong-basis-in-
66. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2006)).
67. Id. at 2674.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2675.
70. Id. at 2677.
71. Id. at 2676.
72. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
73. Id.
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evidence standard "appropriately constrains employers' discretion in
making race-based decisions" because it "limits that discretion to cases in
which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it
is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a
provable, actual violation.,
74
Rather than stopping at announcing the new standard, the Court took
the most unusual step of determining as a matter of law that the test had not
been met-that there was not so much as a triable issue of fact as to
whether or not the new test had been met.75 The Court went on to explain
why the City did not meet the strong basis in evidence standard. On one
hand, the Court explained, the City was undoubtedly "faced with a prima
facie case of disparate-impact liability," by virtue of the stark racial
disparity in the test results and the fact that "certifying the examinations
would have meant that the City could not have considered black candidates
,,76for any of the then-vacant lieutenant or captain positions. Ultimately,
however, the Court found that the second and third steps of the disparate
impact analysis did not meet the new threshold standard; using the City
officials' testimony as to the painstaking steps that it had taken to ensure
that the test was job related and fair, the Court found that "[t]here is no
genuine dispute that the examinations were job-related and consistent with
business necessity. The City's assertions to the contrary are blatantly
contradicted by the record.,
77
Moreover, the Court found, the defendants "also lacked a strong basis
in evidence of an equally valid, less-discriminatory testing alternative that
the City, "by certifying the examination results, would necessarily have
,,78
refused to adopt. The Court concluded that
there is no evidence-let alone the required strong basis in evidence-
that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or because
other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the
City. Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer's reliance on
race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and
qualified for promotions. The City's discarding the test results was
impermissible under Title VII, and summary judgment is appropriate
for petitioners on their disparate-treatment claim.
74. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009).
75. Id. at 2677.
76. Id. at 2677-78.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2679.
79. Id. at 2681.
2009]
Loyola Law Review
Despite the Court's claim that its holding in the case "clarifies how
Title VII applies to resolve competing expectations under the disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact provisions,"80 its guidance was less than
crystalline. The Court had now identified the standard as occupying the
space somewhere in between a potential disparate impact defendant's being
certain that a disparate impact case would succeed (which was deemed
more than that which was necessary to justify a race-conscious intentional
act) and merely having a prima facie case and less than a substantial basis in
evidence to conclude it would ultimately lose the case. This nebulous,
almost indiscernible locus of space is certain to be bemoaned by attorneys
trying to counsel clients who find themselves facing a dilemma like the city
of New Haven. Without the aid of hindsight or a crystal ball, future
potential defendants, situated as the city of New Haven was, will likely-
whether or not they act to avoid disparate impact liability-find themselves
actual defendants in court and less than certain whether they will defend
their choices successfully.
Interestingly, on October 15, 2009, a lawsuit was filed by an African
American firefighter who alleged that the selection process/testing
mechanism utilized by the City was "irrational[]" and "unfair[].
'h
Presumably styled to set forth a disparate impact claim, although adverting
to intent in the form of knowledge that the City likely possessed, the
Complaint took issue with, among other things, the weighting of the
different portions of the test and alleged that "[a]t the time that the City
chose to administer the 2003 exam, it had other alternatives readily
available that would have better served the goal of public safety and, as the
City knew or should have known, would have had much less, if any,
exclusionary effect on African-American candidates."'82 The plaintiff, the
Complaint alleged, would have ranked very highly if the City had opted to
utilize any of these alternatives.8 3 The Complaint requested monetary and
injunctive relief which would make the plaintiff immediately eligible for
the position he alleged he should have had and which would prohibit the
City from utilizing a discriminatory selection system to make promotions or
from implementing a discriminatory weighting system for any test
components without job relatedness or business necessity.8
4
80. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
81. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 6, Briscoe v. New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-
01642 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.plansponsor.com/up load
files/newnewhavensuit.pdf (enter "Briscoe" in Advanced Search and select Conn. Town 's Fire
Dept. Exam Back in the Courts).
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 7-8, Briscoe v. New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-
01642 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.plansponsor.com/up load
[Vol. 55
Transferred Intent in Title VII
The outcome of this case is of interest to many, especially in light of
the fact that the Supreme Court found as a matter of law in Ricci that there
was not a strong basis in evidence to establish that the exams were defective
so as to have been able to confer disparate impact liability on the City. The
premise of the Ricci case was that the plaintiffs had been subject to
disparate treatment based on race. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent,
the City officials "were no doubt conscious of race during their
decisionmaking process, ...but this did not mean they had engaged in
racially disparate treatment. '' 85 Indeed, it looks very much as though the
Court was willing to recast the City's intent to include those conspicuously
absent from the promotion list as disparate treatment "because of race" with
respect to the plaintiffs.
V. OPENING THE DOOR TO A TRANSFERRED INTENT
THEORY UNDER TITLE VII?
There are certain to be numerous critiques of Ricci in the coming
months and years. 86  Perhaps the most interesting wrinkle in this case,,,• ,,87
however, stems from its "premise. Despite the Supreme Court's
proclamation in Ricci that "[d]isparate-treatment cases present the most
easily understood type of discrimination,"8 8 a close reading of the case and
its premise might undermine, if not wholly contravene, this statement. The
Court, it must be recalled, began its analysis of the case by starting from the
basic premise that discarding the examination results "would violate the
disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense. 89
This was true, according to the Court, because "the City chose not to certify
the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race.
However, Title VII's mandate is that an individual should not be subject to
changes in the terms or conditions of employment "because of such
files/newnewhavensuit.pdf (enter "Briscoe" in Advanced Search and select Conn. Town's Fire
Dept. Exam Back in the Courts).
85. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696 (2009) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Suzanne Sataline, Ruling Upends Race's Role in Hiring, WALL
ST. J., June 30, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12462905
0175468575.html (discussing the impact of the Ricci decision on companies and how some
attorneys believe that "the already uncertain role of race in the workplace would be further
unsettled," as "[t]he ruling could cause employers to be overly cautious in their hiring to avoid
mishandling tests or interviews for fear of being sued." On the other hand, some attorneys believe
that "the ruling could bring welcome relief to employers who wouldn't otherwise know how to
handle a similar circumstance.").
87. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
88. Id. at 2672 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977)).




individual's" protected class status-here, race. 9' The Ricci Court even
noted that "the original, foundational prohibition of Title VII bars
employers from taking adverse action 'because of... race.'
92
Were any of the Caucasian plaintiffs actually discriminated against
because of their race, pursuant to the traditional disparate treatment model?
Despite the fact that this was the Supreme Court's very premise, posited
without a doubt, it may very well be argued that the races of those plaintiffs
was not taken into account at all by the decisionmakers, except, as
mentioned above, insofar as they noted the group's lack of diversity.
Perhaps an even trickier question is whether the lone Hispanic
plaintiff, Lieutenant Ben Vargas, who also emerged victorious in this case,
was actually subjected to an adverse job action "because of" his race. It can
hardly be argued that the decision not to certify the test results or the
particular adverse effect felt by Lieutenant Vargas occurred because of his
Hispanic identity. If anything, the City's failure to offer Lieutenant Vargas
the promotion he sued to procure occurred despite and not because of his
race.93 This issue, however, was one that the Court did not appear to deem
worthy of so much as discussion before it set forth its premise that all of the
plaintiffs had been the victims of disparate treatment based on race at the
hand of the City. The Court further stated that the only open question was
whether any consideration undertaken by the City as to the potential for a
disparate impact could somehow justify what it had done.
Moreover, if Lieutenant Vargas was not discriminated against because
of his race, should he, a member of a group included in the designated
"minority firefighters" to whom the City tried to bring justice, inadvertently
harmed, have been excluded from the class? To have done this would have
singled out Lieutenant Vargas, who was identically situated to the other
plaintiffs, on the basis of his race for less protection under the statute in
theory. Granted, he would have benefited nonetheless when the results of
the examination were certified.
To have treated Lieutenant Vargas differently than his fellow plaintiffs
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
92. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
93. This question potentially implicates another vitally important question, which is how one
goes about defining his own race or ethmicity and self-identifying as a member of one class or
another. Whether and how to police one's own self-identification as a member of a protected
class like "Hispanic" is perplexing, and some might say an intractable problem that implicates the
contours of racial and ethnic identity constructs. There is a rich body of literature on this topic.
See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
"Regarded As" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal are White,
2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283 (2005).
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and to do so specifically because of his race would not seem to comport
with Title VII's broad remedial goal of "strik[ing] at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women . . . ,94 To the extent that
Lieutenant Vargas was properly considered to have been the victim of
disparate treatment under Title VII, the Supreme Court, albeit probably
unwittingly, officially opened the door to what may be called a theory of
"transferred intent" under Title VII. This theory provides that one who was
not the intended target of a race-based action or a race-conscious decision
has recourse under Title VII for an adverse action that befell the individual
despite and certainly not "because of' the individual's race. As will be
discussed, some lower court cases have seemed to so hold, while other
lower court cases that have rejected this precept.
To the extent that the Supreme Court decided the issue once and for
all in Ricci, it looks to have been far from a knowing, conscious holding.
Nonetheless, just as one who aims to strike one person but strikes another is
liable for the tort of intentional battery via the principle of transferred
intent, so now may an employer whose intent to diversify the workplace
generally and to look at the races of those who are not benefited or present
be liable for intentional, race-based discrimination against those whose
races it does not explicitly consider.
It should be noted that Lieutenant Vargas was physically and savagely
attacked in 2004. He believes this was in retaliation for his having joined
the Caucasian plaintiffs in Ricci and claiming race discrimination. 95 Indeed,
he revealed in a recent New York Times article that he quit the Hispanic
Firefighters' Association after it and its members refused to publicly
support him in the lawsuit. 96 Lieutenant Vargas had achieved the sixth
highest score on the test, and was, as the New York Times reported,
"ridiculed as a token, a turncoat and an Uncle Tom-all of which, he said,
'made my resolve that much stronger.' ''97 He will likely now receive the
promotion to captain that he sought when he sat for the exam.98
Arguably Lieutenant Vargas, as the lone Hispanic plaintiff, was
harmed by the decision not to certify the examination results as one who
was not African American, as were the Caucasian plaintiffs. Following this
logic, it may be argued that his inclusion in the class of those harmed stems
94. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
95. A.G. Sulzberger, Bias Suit A Test of Resolve for Hispanic Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009,






from his racial identity. This assertion, however, is not only weak, but is
also wholly belied by the District Court and the Supreme Court's own
assertion that the intentional act at issue occurred when "the City rejected
the test results because 'too many whites and not enough minorities would
be promoted were the lists to be certified."'
99
In any event, ponder two even tougher hypotheticals. First, consider
an African American plaintiff who had done well enough on the exam to
attain promotion and sought to be included among the plaintiffs. In that
case, would the Court have denied relief to this plaintiff, identically situated
to the other plaintiffs, based on nothing more than his race? Finally,
consider a second scenario in which, unlike this case, the defendant has
evinced express, discriminatory racial animus. If an employer with an
expressed bias against Asian Americans announced that in an attempt to
lower the number of Asian Americans in his workforce, he would be firing
all employees who had one-syllable last names, and if a non Asian-
American got fired because of this, would a cause of action under Title VII
be viable? Again, to the extent that this plaintiff could not sue under Title
VII, the law would be permitting a race-based/race conscious act that,
unlike the one in Ricci, was actually motivated by explicit, expressed
discriminatory bias, rather than a conciliatory attempt to adversely affect an
individual with no recourse. If he could be a plaintiff, however, as he likely
could now under Ricci, the law has then moved to a point at which the
invidious intent shown by the employer toward one group is actually
transferred to a member of another class or group adversely affected by the
same decision. To the extent that this is now the case, it needs to be
recognized, as should the irony of its likely having been unwittingly
accomplished by the Ricci Court.
The Ricci Court looks to have paved the way for the incorporation of
transferred intent theory into Title VII law, not only through the substance
of its rulings, but through the language it used. The broadness, and even
vagueness, of the language employed in statements such as "[w]ithout some
other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title
VII's command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions
because of an individual's race,"' 01 cannot be denied and lends credence to
the transferred intent theory of Title VII. The Court observed that "the City
made its employment decision because of race," when it "rejected the test
99. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009)).
100. Posting of Kerri Stone courtesy of Howard Wasserman to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/page/3/ (July 6, 2009, 06:46 CST).
101. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
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results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white."' 102 When
the Court concluded that the City's "own arguments . . . show that the
City's reasons for advocating non-certification were related to the racial
distribution of the results," and found, based on this relationship, that the
race-consciousness present in the decision was tantamount to the disparate
treatment of all of the plaintiffs who sought to have the examination results
certified, 103 it made the determination that discrimination against anyone
that is accomplished through the vehicle of a "race-conscious" or "race-
based" decision is disparate treatment. Moreover, the Court determined that
this amounts to disparate treatment irrespective of whether the intent is to
harm any group, let alone the group adversely affected by the decision.
This determination is made more remarkable by the fact that the disparate
treatment cause of action, as opposed to the disparate impact cause of
action, requires a showing of intent to discriminate by the plaintiff."'
A. TRANSFERRED INTENT
It is important to give some background as to the law of transferred
intent, whereby the law literally permits the transferal of one's intent to
affect or consider someone onto someone else who was not the object of the
intent, but nonetheless sustained harm due to action spurred by it. The
doctrine of transferred intent is well entrenched in American law and has a
long history in both tort and criminal law.'0 5 In criminal law, the doctrine
of transferred intent applies when one's intent to harm another individual is
literally "transferred" to an unintended victim, rendering the actor liable for
an intentional crime despite the fact that he had no intent to harm his
victim. 10 6 Thus,
[t]he doctrine of transferred intent indicates that where an individual is
attempting to harm one person and as a result accidentally harms
another, the intent to harm the first person is transferred to the second
102. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
103. Id. at 2673.
104. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
105. See People v. Slater, No. 4-07-0966, 2009 WL 3163518, at *6 (Il1. App. Ct. June 26,
2009).
106. See 6 AM. JuR. 2D Assault and Battery § 20 (2008); see, e.g., Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d
144, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("The doctrine of transferred intent operates to transfer the
defendant's intent with respect to the intended victim to the unintended victim." (citing Mordica v.
State, 618 So. 2d 301, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993))). But see People v. Lee, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
723, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (transferred intent should not apply in an assault case since a
defendant is not required to have the intention to strike any particular person to be guilty of an




person and the individual attempting harm is held criminally liable as
if he both intended to harm and did harm the same person.
The theory of transferred intent has been referred to as a "legal
fiction" deployed to ensure that a criminal defendant is held fully
accountable for her crime. °8 It has typically been used in "so-called 'bad
aim' situations where a defendant, while intending to kill one person,
accidentally kills an innocent bystander or another unintended victim."' 0 9
In tort law, the elements of an intentional tort may be met
notwithstanding the fact that the victim harmed was not the actor's intended
victim. 10 Referred to by one scholar as an "ancient common-law fiction
that continues to be recognized as an active part of American tort law," the
doctrine in tort law is "described in casebooks and treatises, tested on bar
examinations, asserted by attorneys on behalf of clients, discussed and
applied by courts, and is even acknowledged by the American Law
Institute." Although its continued viability has been questioned,' 12 and
even Dean Prosser has made reference to the doctrine as a "curious survival
of the antique law,"' 13 the doctrine has been and remains a mainstay of the
American common law of torts. Driven by the basic principle that "[t]he
intention follows the bullet,""' 4 the doctrine has been justified in policy
terms, so as to articulate the "tendency to impose liability more easily and
more broadly on a defendant whose conduct was intended to do harm than
on a defendant who was merely negligent," where the "extensive liability
can be justified either on the basis of the possible violation of the criminal
law involved or simply on the antisocial and immoral nature of a
defendant's behavior." 1 Thus, because "[a]n intentional wrongdoer is not
107. State v. Mullins, 602 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
108. People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
109. State v. Fekete, 901 P.2d 708, 714 (N.M. 1995) (citing State v. Wilson, 863 P.2d 116, 121
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd in part, 883 P.2d 320 (Wash. 1994) ("The doctrine of transferred
intent was created to avoid the specific intent requirement and thus hold the defendant accountable
for the consequences of his behavior when he injures an unintended victim.")).
110. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 20 (2008); see, e.g., Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d
526, 533 (7th Cir. 1992) ("If A aims at B, and hits C, C can sue A for battery, even though he was
not the intended victim and even though battery is an intentional tort.").
111. Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 903,
903-06 (2004).
112. Id. at 907 n.8, 908 (questioning whether the concept of transferred intent should "continue
to be indulged when ordinary, honest negligence principles are usually sufficient to provide a clear
path to compensation," and noting that one author has described transferred intent as being
"unnecessary because the same result of imposing liability for an intentional tort can be achieved
by other means") (citing Osborne M. Reynolds, infra note 115, at 529).
113. William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 650 (1967).
114. Id. at 650 (quoting State v. Batson, 96 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Mo. 1936)).
115. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Transferred Intent: Should Its "Curious Survival" Continue?,
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considered entitled to invoke the defense that the harm he caused was
merely an unintended accident," and despite the fact that "the requirement
of causation is basically the same in tort cases founded on wrongful intent
as in cases based on negligence, the courts as a matter of policy will allow
liability to be imposed for more remote consequences in the cases of
wrongful intent.""
Assuming this principle were to be consciously applied to Title VII
liability, it would appear that, because the City tried to effectuate a decision
so as to ensure that not just Caucasians, but African Amerians and other
minority groups were promoted as well, it intentionally took aim at the test.
To the extent that anyone was adversely affected by the City's refusal to
certify the examination results, and he was African American, or Hispanic
like Lieutenant Vargas, then allowing that person to sue under Title VII for
intentional disparate treatment based on race would create a legal fiction
whereby the City's race consciousness and intent to deny a benefit to a
group that was predominantly Caucasian is transferred to that plaintiff,
regardless of whether he is Caucasian, African American or "other."
Courts and jurists have, throughout the tortured history of Title VII
jurisprudence, attempted to distinguish between "discrimination in the air,"
as opposed to "discrimination brought to ground and visited upon an
employee,"' 7 signifying that "plaintiffs, in order to prevail [on a disparate
treatment theory] ... must prove that they have been victims of intentional
race discrimination. As with negligence, discrimination 'in the air, so to
speak, will not do' when it comes to assigning liability.' 18 In light of the
fact that transferred intent has made its way into Title VII jurisprudence-
inasmuch as the law permits a plaintiff a viable cause of action where the
decision maker does not look at his or her protected class status at all-
there is an argument to be made that this application is misplaced.
50 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 531 (1997).
116. Reynolds, supra note 115, at 531 (citing Ralph S. Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as
Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586, 588 (1933); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE 170 (1927)).
117. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); see also Randle v. LaSalle
Telecomms., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the employer's accused
discriminatory practices were not based on race, as the court recognized the Hopkins Court's
finding that "(riemarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that
gender played a part in a particular employment decision"); Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20
F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199-1200 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that direct evidence of racial animus
existed, and employee plaintiffs had established a prima facie case under Title VII where two
supervisors, who had uttered racial remarks and began a racially-motivated campaign to have the
plaintiffs fired, were "meaningfully involved" in the employees' discharge).
118. Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms., 697 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (N.D. I11. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d
563 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing F. POLLOCK, LAWS OF TORTS 468 (13th ed. 1920)).
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On the other hand, where race-conscious decisions are motivated by
outright animus against a protected class sought to be benefited by Title
VII-like the example given earlier about Asian Americans 19-the broad
remedial goals of the legislation and other pieces of legislation like it would
point toward a victory in court for anyone adversely affected by the animus.
The alternative is to write off those who are not members of a protected
class contemplated by the decision maker as collateral damage of sorts. It is
not a far stretch to apply the doctrine of transferred intent to Title VII
jurisprudence, or to antidiscrimination jurisprudence generally, for that
matter. The question at hand, however, before one can consider whether
such a step is prudent, is whether it is an application that the Supreme Court
was wholly cognizant and supportive of when it drafted Ricci, and the
answer seems to be no.
However, the ramifications of this assertion are substantial. To the
extent that a decision to fire, hire, promote, or even to spare someone from
an adverse action may be deemed race-based or race-cognizant, others who
are adversely affected may sue under a disparate treatment theory pursuant
to Title VII, regardless of whether their protected class status played any
role in the decision. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which an
employer, to stave off a claim of discrimination under Title VII, opts to
impact one employee rather than another under circumstances that,
buttressed by ample testimony, may be deemed race-based, or even class-
based.
Could Title VII have been contemplated by those who passed it to
afford a right of action to individuals who were evaluated with an eye
toward not what their class status is, but rather toward what it is not?
Despite the broad remedial goals of Title VII, evinced by its legislative
history, the plain language of the statute does not suggest this result. These
and other questions, however, will need to be answered as litigators look
closely at the premise assumptions, language, and underpinnings of Ricci,
and present lower courts nationwide with new and potentially troubling
theories of suit.
B. TITLE VII AND STANDING
It is crucial to recognize that so-called third party standing cases and
other cases in which those whose protected class status was not itself a
factor in their treatment have largely been grouped together. There are,
however, several different bases upon which a claim may be said to lie or
not lie where the victim's class status was not necessarily implicated by the
119. See discussion supra p. 768.
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decision or treatment at issue. For example, one plaintiff may recover for
sexual harassment that she was harmed by witnessing, but did not
experience herself. Another plaintiff may successfully allege that due to
discrimination against a racial group to which he does not belong, he has
lost associational rights and privileges with members of that group and has
been harmed by that loss. A third plaintiff may have a cognizable claim
when he earns a lower wage than he should due to the fact that he works in
a field that is predominantly female and holds a job title whose prestige has
been tarnished by gender discrimination against women, although he is
male.
It is important to recognize the range and various categories of cases
in which one's own protected class status is not alleged to have engendered
the harm one sustained, but rather animus or discrimination directed at a
class to which the plaintiff does not belong. There have only, however,
been a handful of cases like Ricci, in which members of a group alleged a
harm that stemmed from sensitivity or animus toward another protected
class status. A closer look at the relationship between Title VII and
standing becomes necessary prior to sorting out these cases.
In the midst of the media firestorm swirling around the cross-
allegations of racism, the city of New Haven's attempt to straddle a thin,
and some might say illusory, line between disparate treatment and disparate
impact and the Court's pronouncement of a standard for evaluating whether
an entity has run afoul of Title VII when attempting to accommodate
competing interests, Ricci overlooked something very significant. It
.appears as though the Supreme Court decided a very important issue that
has split and confused courts, but it did not formally elucidate this decision
or even explicitly acknowledge that it was making a decision.
Title VII provides a private right of action for one "claiming to be
aggrieved ... by [an] alleged unlawful employment practice. 120 The word
"aggrieved" has been held by many courts to be a question of standing, and
such questions "often turn[] on the nature and source of the claim
asserted." 12 1 The issue of whether Congress intended Title VII standing to
be as broad as Article III standing 122 has not yet been taken up by the
Supreme Court.123 It is the case, then, that "[t]he scope of Title VII's
private right of action.., depends on whether Congress intended to insulate
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (2006).
121. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
122. For a thorough explanation of Article III standing, see Annotation, Substantial Interest:
Standing, CRS ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, http://www.law.comell.edu/annconlhtml/art3
fragl6_.user.htil (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
123. Leibovitz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2001).
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such an action from prudential concerns."'
24
Prudential standing is the issue of "'whether the . . . statutory
provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."", 25 The Supreme
Court has never ruled on the issue of whether prudential standing limits the
right of action under Title VII; however, several lower courts have
addressed the issue.126
Scholars have taken note of what they call "transferred impact sexual
harassment cases," in which individuals not directly targeted by harassers
are permitted to bring suit nonetheless because of the effect of that
harassment on them in the workplace. 127 In this vein, it is useful to look to
a case like Childress v. City of Richmond,128 a 1997 Fourth Circuit case that
124. Leibovitz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2001).
125. Id. at 185 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
126. E.g., id. at 186 (explaining that "[tihe scope of Title VII's private right of action ...
depends on whether Congress intended to insulate such an action from prudential concerns");
Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Caucasian
female employee lacked standing under Title VII to allege injury on behalf of African American
applicants to an employment agency who were discriminated against because of race); Childress
II, infra note 129, at 1209 (Luttig, J., concurring) (explaining that "Congress may, if it chooses,
override prudential standing limitations and authorize all persons who satisfy the Constitution's
standing requirements to bring particular actions in federal court" and finding that "because the
white male plaintiffs in the present case assert only the rights of third-parties to be free from race
or sex-based discrimination in the workplace, they have not stated a cause of action under Title
VII"); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd
on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The [defendant]
appropriately looks to the [Rehabilitation Act's] language to determine whether Congress granted
an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing
rules.").
127. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Lome H. Seidman, Should Prudential Standing
Requirements Be Applied in Transferred Impact Sexual Harassment Cases? An Analysis of
Childress v. City of Richmond, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 261 (1999) (asserting that Title VII needs to
afford third-party standing in title VII race discrimination cases); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-
Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 66-67 (2002)
(arguing that "[t]he law should encourage and protect workers who reject discriminatory
relationships and who instead adopt Title VII's vision of workplace equality and its catalytic role
in eroding other forms of discrimination," and that "[i]f Title VII cannot forbid that invitation and
defend the officers who spurned it, then antidiscrimination law misses an opportunity to promote
the spontaneous, rank-and-file embrace of Title VII values," because "[w]ithout such protection,
employees can be expected to take the path of least resistance and acquiesce in discriminatory
workplaces, indeed to develop an investment in them"). But cf. Leibovitz v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 186 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a plaintiff possessed standing to bring a
hostile work environment claim despite the fact that she, herself had not been a direct target of the
harasser, and that her "injury [wa]s sufficient to establish standing under Article III," because it
was "distinct and palpable").
128. Childress v. City of Raymond, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated, 134 F.3d 1205 (4
Cir. 1998) (en banc) [hereinafter Childress I].
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generated division within the court as to the interplay between standing and
antidiscrimination law.
In Childress, the plaintiffs, Caucasian male police officers, alleged
that they had been subjected to a hostile environment and retaliation in
violation of Title VII after a supervisor "repeatedly made disparaging
remarks to and about female and black members of the police force that
adversely affected vital relationships and working conditions within the
force."' 12 9 A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit held that police officers
who were Caucasian and male could sue for sexual harassment under Title
VII after their colleagues, who were female and African American, were
harassed in their presence and conflict ensued.
130
Upon a rehearing en banc, the court vacated this decision on the basis
that it improperly necessitated a mandate of the same-sex hostile
environment theory of sexual harassment.' 3  This point of law was later
obviated by the Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services,' 32 which held that same-sex sexual harassment was, in fact,
actionable, 3 3 causing scholars to maintain that "the holding in Childress...
may pose considerable problems for employers that could spread with
significant consequences," despite its having been vacated. 134 Of particular
note was a concurring opinion signed on to by three judges, which stated:
Congress ...was not writing on a clean slate when it authorized
"aggrieved persons" to bring Title VII actions. In the law, the phrase
"aggrieved person" has long been a "term of art" ordinarily understood
to mean those persons who could satisfy both prudential and
constitutional standing limitations.... Among the prudential limits on
standing is not only the "zone of interests" requirement, but also, of
course, the general prohibition against third-party standing ...
Congress may, if it chooses, override prudential standing limitations
and authorize all persons who satisfy the Constitution's standing
requirements to bring particular actions in federal court. But where it
has not done so, and instead has simply invoked the term of art
129. Childress v. Richmond, 134 F.3d 1207 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) [hereinafter Childress
II].
130. Childress I, supra note 128, at 478.
131. Childress II, supra note 129, at 1207.
132. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
133. Id. at 79-80 (noting that Title VII's protection from sexual harassment "must extend to
sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements").
134. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 127, at 262-63 (concluding that "in light of the Oncale
decision, courts ruling in future Childress type transferred impact cases will no longer be able to




"aggrieved person," the default rule generally is that Congress has
created a cause of action only for those persons who can satisfy both
types of standing requirements--constitutional and prudential.
35
The concurrence reasoned that, "in order to qualify as a 'person
aggrieved' . . . , a plaintiff must be a member of the class of direct victims
of conduct prohibited by Title VII, that is, the plaintiff must assert his own• ,,116
statutory rights . . . . Thus, the concurrence concluded, "because the
white male plaintiffs ...assert only the rights of third-parties to be free
from race or sex-based discrimination in the workplace, they have not stated
a cause of action under Title VII." 137
The confusion evinced by the judges in the Childress case as to
precisely how or why the case should or should not be permitted to proceed,
it has been noted, has "ranged from granting judicial standing to the
Childress plaintiffs to denying it, with three appellate judges, in a
concurring opinion, making a distinction between the prudential standing
requirements of Title VII and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.'
Much of the confusion that still inheres on this subject may be traced back
to courts' application of a Supreme Court opinion on standing that arose in
the context of a Title VIII claim.
In 1972, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Corp.,139 the
Supreme Court found that both a Caucasian tenant and an African
American tenant had standing to sue the owner of the apartment complex in
which they all resided under § 810 of the Fair Housing Act"' (Title VIII),
which provided, at the time, that "[a]ny person who claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be
irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to




The plaintiffs alleged that, due to racial discrimination against
minority groups in the rental of apartments in the complex in which they all
resided, they had incurred three injuries: (1) the loss of the social benefits
that they should have derived from living in a community that was racially
135. Childress II, supra note 129, at 1208-09 (Luttig, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1209 (Luttig, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
138. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 127, at 263.
139. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Corp., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006).
141. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212; see also Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-285, 82 Stat.
85 (repealed 1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (2006)).
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integrated; (2) the loss of business and professional advantages that would
have inured to them as a result of living in a diverse and integrated
community; and (3) the shame and the economic damage that inured to
them as a result of living in what was deemed a "white ghetto.1 42 The
Court held that "the loss of important benefits from interracial associations"
sufficed as an allegation of injury so as to confer standing on plaintiffs of
all races. 143 According to the Court, after examining the legislative history
of the statute, "the proponents of the legislation emphasized that those who
were not the direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair
housing, as they too suffered,"'144 and the "person on the landlord's blacklist
is not the only victim of discriminatory housing practices; it is, as Senator
Javits said in supporting the bill, 'the whole community."",
145
Trafficante then became widely cited in a variety of cases involving
concerns about standing, injury, and whether a decision was made or harm
or an injury conferred "because of' protected class status, without much
regard for the factual and legal differences among these different cases.
Three years after Trafficante was decided, Justice White, in a dissenting
opinion in Sosna v. Iowa noted that "Congress has expressed an intention
and provided that any person 'claiming to be aggrieved' could bring suit
under Title VII to challenge discriminatory employment practices" because
any discrimination in employment based upon sexual or racial
characteristics aggrieves an employee or an applicant for employment
having such characteristics by stigmatization and explicit or implicit
application of a badge of inferiority, [and] Congress gave such persons
standing by statute to continue an attack upon such discrimination even
though they fail to establish particular injury to themselves in being
denied employment unlawfully.1
4 6
This comment, however, seems to address itself to scenarios in which
prospective plaintiffs share traits or characterizations with those in a
protected class that lead to their similar stigmatization, despite the fact that
the plaintiffs have incurred no harm personally. In the Ricci scenario,
however, the only thing that plaintiffs of different ethnicities or races would
share is the circumstance of having succeeded on the exam at issue, and all
of the plaintiffs would be able to claim the same injury: their failure to• 147
receive the promised promotion. The question thus remains as to
142. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Corp., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
143. Id. at 209-10.
144. Id. at 210.
145. Id. at 211 (citing 114 CONG. REc. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
146. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 413 n.1 (1975) (White, J., dissenting).
147. The majority and dissenting justices in Ricci v. DeStefano disagreed over whether actual
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whether Ricci indeed lays the groundwork for the incorporation of• • , 148
"transferred intent" into Title VII jurisprudence. The most extreme case
arises with respect to those who share neither class-rooted characteristics
nor stigmatization with the protected class being discriminated against.
More than one circuit's court of appeals has "applied Trafficante to
the workplace context, ruling that Title VII's phrase 'person claiming to be
aggrieved,' . . . allows 'third-party' standing to the fullest extent permitted
by Article III's case or controversy requirement."149  Several circuits have
pointed out similarities between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act, with
the Seventh Circuit noting that
[b]oth take broad aim at discrimination in their respective sectors and
in that sense are the functional equivalents of one another; ... both
authorize individuals to bring suit for statutory violations and in this
way to act as "private attorneys general," . . . and in permitting any
injury existed from the City's decision to discard the exams. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that "[t]he injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the
candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had established for the
promotional process." Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). Because of the
substantial time and money that candidates committed to preparing for the exam, the majority
believed that "the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the
process was all the more severe." Id. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, however, downplayed this
possible repercussion of discarding the exams despite the employees' legitimate expectations,
stating that "it [is] more regrettable to rely on flawed exams to shut out candidates who may well
have the command presence and other qualities needed to excel as fire officers." Id. at 2710
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
148. See Lyman v. Nabil's Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1443, 1447 (D. Kan. 1995) (stating that "[Title
VIII does not specifically address whether an unlawful [employment action] directed at a person
in a protected class is actionable by a person who, although outside the protected class, is
allegedly injured by the unlawful practice"); see also Zatz, supra note 127, at 63. Zatz explains
that:
[t]he... tendency, away from broad Article III standing and toward specific recognition of
interests in intergroup association or freedom from work in a non-discriminatory
environment, is ... problematic. To the extent that injury to these interests would itself give
plaintiffs a cause of action, the theory threatens to become untethered from Title VII's
language, which requires a showing that an employer discriminated against an individual
because of his or her own race or sex. [The] conclusion that Title VII confers a "right to
work in an atmosphere free of discrimination and to enjoy myriad benefits of associating
with members of other racial or ethnic groups," would make the Title VII violation, not just
standing to sue, turn on "emotional or psychological injury to the plaintiff herself" without
showing either that this injury occurred because of plaintiffs race or sex or that some other
employee was discriminated against because of race or sex.
Zatz, supra note 127, at 92 (quoting Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir.
1985)).
149. Palmer v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 356 F.3d 235, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to
determine whether Trafficante applies to a Title VII claim of denial of interracial association in
the workplace) (citing Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Miss.
Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976); Gray
v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
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person aggrieved by a violation to file a charge and suit, both reflect a
congressional intent to extend standing to the fullest extent permitted
by Article III of the Constitution.
50
In any event, however, would Trafficante extend to any Title VII case
that implicates standing?15' Courts applying Trafficante, interestingly, have
referred to it as the Supreme Court's first recognition of "the viability of a
claim for denial of interracial association.' 52  Indeed, one circuit court
called Trafficante "the seminal associational standing case in the race
discrimination context.' 53 This makes Trafficante's significance less than
clear in cases in which one's right to a diverse workplace or associational
rights are not threatened--cases like Ricci.154 In very recent jurisprudence,
in fact, courts have cautioned that "[language in cases . . . that standing
under Title VII was intended to be as broad as Article III permits, must be
taken in context."'1
55
150. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297-98 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that so-called employment "testers" who experience discrimination when applying for positions
have standing to sue the prospective employers under Title VII, despite the fact that they never
genuinely sought employment); see, e.g., Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 90 n.23 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that "Title VIII is analogous to Title VII"); Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) ("More persuasive is the parallel between
Title VII and Title VIII noted by both courts and commentators.") (citing United States v. Starrett
City Ass'n, 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1988)); Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 482 (noting that "the
strong similarities between the language, design, and purposes of Title VII and the Fair Housing
Act require that the phrase 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' in § 706 of Title VII must be
construed in the same manner that Trafficante construed the term 'aggrieved person' in § 810 of
the Fair Housing Act") (citing EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 450-54 (6th Cir. 1977)); see
also Elliot M. Mincberg, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 1 I
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 128, 158-60 (1976).
151. In Lyman v. Nabil's Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1995), the court stated that "[Title
VII] does not specifically address whether an unlawful business practice directed at a person in a
protected class is actionable by a person who, although outside the protected class, is allegedly
injured by the unlawful practice." Lyman, 903 F. Supp. at 1447.
152. Palmer v. Occidental Chem. Corp. 356 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2004); see also EEOC v.
Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 439, 454 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a white plaintiff could challenge
her employer's discrimination against African Americans because the discrimination implicated
her interest in an integrated workplace). The court noted:
[T]he EEOC has interpreted Title VII to confer upon every employee the right to a working
environment free from unlawful employment discrimination. Under the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, whites are aggrieved by discrimination against blacks at their
place of employment and have standing to file charges with the EEOC and sue in court..
Id.
153. Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 90 (3d Cir. 1999).
154. See Zatz, supra note 126, at 87 ("[C]ourts drawing on Trafficante for Title VII purposes
have [shown] ambivalence between broad Article III standing and standing based on a specific
interest in interracial associations.").
155. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 817 n.l (6th Cir. 2009); see also Zatz,
supra note 126, at 92 ("Broad standing separates injury from discrimination, permitting a wide
class of injured plaintiffs to sue, but only when employment discrimination can be proven against
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Thus, when a male plaintiff sued his former employer under Title VII,
alleging that he had been retaliated against after his fiancee filed a gender
discrimination charge, the court said that Trafficante cannot
properly be read to say that any person affected by the imposition of
retaliation should be deemed sufficiently aggrieved to bring a Title VII
claim. While Title VII can be interpreted to protect the right of people
to associate with people of different races, it can hardly be interpreted
to protect the right of people to associate with people who have been
retaliated against. 156
This raises further questions about when so-called third-party standing is
and should be afforded, and necessitates a breakdown of the various types
of third-party cases. Clearly, not all of them will fall into the Ricci model,
whereby at least one plaintiff suffered an alleged harm despite his protected
class status but only because of attention paid to others' races.
C. DOES A PLAINTIFF HAVE STANDING TO SUE UNDER TITLE VII
AFTER WITNESSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SOMEONE ELSE?
In Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority,157 the female plaintiff
who had not herself been harassed, but who alleged she was harmed
nonetheless by the harassment of others, attempted to sue her employer
under Title VII for sexual harassment. 58 The Court found that the plaintiff
had standing to sue because her injury was not "vicarious" but rather
resulted from the plaintiffs own work situation.159 Contrasting Leibovitz's
case with those in which plaintiffs assert rights on behalf of others, the
Second Circuit found that the plaintiff shared a protected class status with
those whom she alleged had been discriminated against, and that the factual
issue that her case turned upon was whether she herself had sustained any
psychological harm because her personal work environment was hostile as
a result of discrimination inflicted upon other women. The court thus
declined to decide the issue of whether prudential concerns limit standing
under Title VII. 161
It is vital, however, to distinguish between cases in which a plaintiff is
someone else.").
156. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 817 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009).
157. Leibovitz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 185-88 (2d Cir. 2001).
158. Id. at 181-82 (noting that the plaintiff claimed that "she suffered a major depressive
disorder" working for her employer who had an "inadequate response" to alleged sexual
harassment taking place in "other parts of her workplace").
159. See id. at 183, 188.
160. Id. at 186.
161. Leibovitz, 252 F.3d at 186.
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suing for his or her own harm sustained by discrimination and those cases
in which he is suing for harm that may be called derivative, in that it inured
to him or her by virtue of having witnessed discrimination against others.
In cases in which plaintiffs have alleged that witnessing discrimination
against others injured them by poisoning their work environments and
making them hostile, courts have divided over the issue of standing, with
some courts finding that "[s]tanding for purposes of Title VII is not limited
to minority groups. Rather, it is dependent upon whether the plaintiff is a
person claiming to be aggrieved by such discrimination."
161
However, other courts have found that "Trafficante did not abolish all
limits on third-party standing in civil rights cases," and that so-called third-
party discrimination does not always warrant the conferral of standing to
the so-called third-parties who witness and object to discrimination against
others. 163 In Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc.,164 the Seventh Circuit held
that a Caucasian female plaintiff lacked standing under Title VII to allege
that her coworkers either were themselves biased against African
Americans or tolerated clients' racial prejudices in placement of workers. 161
Observing that "[n]one of the comments was directed against her
personally," the court held that "[a]lthough the comments . . . reflect
actionable discrimination against applicants for employment, a reasonable
person in [the plaintiffs] position would have found them 'merely
offensive', because they posed no threat to her personally., 166 The court
contrasted this holding with its holding in a previous case, noting that it had
previously held that a "white employee could be aggrieved by the lack of
black employees in the workplace if that produced 'the loss of important
benefits from interracial associations,' but this was a personal loss []which
must be proved rather than just asserted."1 67
Thus, many cases have adjudicated scenarios in which plaintiffs claim
162. Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
white employee had standing to sue for a racially discriminatory work environment); see also
Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of racial discrimination."). But see
Lyman v. Nabil's Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1443, 1447 (D. Kan. 1995) ( "Most courts that have
considered the question seem to hold that males lack standing to sue because they are not 'persons
aggrieved' under Title VII when they seek redress for injuries suffered due to alleged
discrimination directed at women.").
163. Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
164. Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1176.
165. Id. at 1180-81.
166. Id. at 1181.
167. Id. at 1180 (quoting Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir.1982)).
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to have been harmed from their proximity to racism, discrimination, and
harassment, with some finding that the plaintiffs may bring suit"' and
others finding that they may not. Numerous other cases have held that
the loss of association with members of discriminated-against classes may
afford Title VII standing to non-class members.
170
Ricci, however, is not a case in which members of one protected class
were discriminated against while members of other classes were forced to
stand by and witness it; it is a case in which members of more than one
group all suffered the fate of the City refusing to certify the results of an
exam on which they had done well. This scenario necessitates the
examination of a group of cases that ask whether a plaintiff has standing to
sue under Title VII where he or she is swept up in discrimination against
another group, such that his or her harm is identical to that of the group
members.
168. See, e.g., Childress I, supra note 128, at 481 ("Trafficante []... has been adopted by every
court of appeals that has considered the issue of a white person's standing to sue under Title VII
for associational or hostile environment claims flowing from discriminatory conduct directed at
black persons."); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that
the African American plaintiff, claiming that "his mental state" was impaired and that he felt
"isolat[ed] as a result of being one of the favored blacks who had slipped through the allegedly
discriminatory screening practices," had standing, where the defendant's hiring practices
"excluded blacks from employment as bus drivers").
169. See, e.g., Blanks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D. Miss. 2007)
(holding that a Caucasian employee who sought to recover damages for emotional distress after he
witnessed a Caucasian racist shoot his African American coworkers and friends lacked standing to
bring suit under § 1981).
170. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that a white
woman had standing where the complaint alleged that she was subjected to a work environment
where racial discrimination persisted, and which prevented her from the benefits of interracial
association). In Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), the court opined:
[I]nterpersonal contacts-between members of the same or different races-are no less a part
of the work environment than of the home environment. Indeed, in modem America, a
person is as likely, and often more likely to know his fellow workers than the tenants next
door or down the hall. The possibilities of advantageous personal, professional or business
contacts are certainly as great at work as at home. The benefits of interracial harmony are as
great in either locale. The distinction between laws aimed at desegregation and laws aimed
at equal opportunity is illusory. These goals are opposite sides of the same coin.
Waters, 547 F.2d at 469. In accord was EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 482-83 (5th Cir.
1980), which said:
Although Summers' amended charge fails to disclose the specific injury that she suffered
because of the College's alleged racially discriminatory practices, we accept the argument of
the EEOC that Summers could claim that the discrimination deprived her of the benefits
arising from association with racial minorities in a working environment unaffected by
discrimination.
Miss Coll., 626 F.2d at 482-83. See also EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 451-54 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978) (holding that an individual may be a considered "a
person claiming to be aggrieved" under Title VII, and thus have standing, where a white woman
had possibly suffered from the loss of benefits that stemmed from her not being able to associate
with racial minorities at work because of her employer's discriminatory practices).
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D. STANDING TO SUE UNDER TITLE VII WHEN DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST ANOTHER GROUP RESULTS IN HARM TO PLAINTIFF
This scenario-as opposed to one in which a plaintiff witnessed
another's discrimination or harassment, shared class-rooted traits with those
who were discriminated against or harassed, or lost associational rights with
members of different classes-seems to be that presented in Ricci. The
question may be broken down in one of several ways. On one level, one
might ask whether any individual Caucasian plaintiffs race in any way
brought about the harm that he sustained, and to the extent that their races
did not, whether they may be said to have been the victims of disparate
treatment.
Some scholars have wondered whether perhaps a claim for systemic
disparate treatment would have been a better, or at least a more accurate
route, for these plaintiffs. Such a case, however, would have most likely
been brought as a class action suit alleging that the City engaged in a
"pattern or practice" of intentional discrimination, meaning that racial
discrimination "was the employer's standard operating procedure rather
than a sporadic occurrence."' 7 According to Professor Michael Zimmer, it
cannot be said in this case that a policy was implemented whereby a clear
racial line could be drawn between those benefited and those harmed.1
72
Rather, Professor Zimmer argues that, in Ricci, African Americans,
Hispanics, and Caucasians-"fall on both sides of the line and there is no
express policy to discriminate .... [N]ot all members of one racial group
were on one side of the line . .. and . .. there was no express policy
drawing any racial division."' 173 Moreover, Professor Zimmer argues that it
is similarly "not clear that the systemic disparate treatment cases based on
statistical evidence proving the employer had an intentionally
discriminatory employment practice support the holding in Ricci."'
4
Whereas the seminal cases of Teamsters and Hazelwood School District
contained statistics that established discriminatory intent, he argues, in Ricci
the Caucasian plaintiffs made up "only 25% of all the whites who took the
test." 175 Thus, he concludes, the statistics in Ricci alone are "unlikely to
171. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
172. Posting of Professor Michael Zimmer to Conflicting Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/ 1/ricci-color-blind-standards-in-a-race-
conscious-society.html (Nov. 20, 2009, 8:49 CST).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Posting of Professor Michael Zimmer to Conflicting Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/1 1/ricci-color-blind-standards-in-a-race-
conscious-society.htmi (Nov. 20, 2009, 8:49 CST).
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support drawing an inference of intentional race discrimination against the
members of any of the... groups without drawing the same inference as to
the members of each of the . ..groups. That would not be disparate
treatment discrimination." '76
Nevertheless, the Caucasian plaintiffs were able to demonstrate
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. The more salient question one
might ask, specifically with respect to Lieutenant Vargas or a hypothetical
African American plaintiff, is whether disparate treatment alleged to be
aimed at a group of which one is not a member, that causes one harm due
purely to shared circumstance, and not to shared traits or loss of
associational rights, engenders a viable Title VII claim for that plaintiff.
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to note this in Ricci, courts had
seemingly split on the answer to this question prior to Ricci.
In Anjelino v. New York Times Co.,177 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiffs-male employees-had standing to sue
under Title VII for sex discrimination against women where they alleged
that they suffered pecuniary injury when they were included on a priority
list among female employees, whom the defendant employer allegedly178leedteeea
discriminatorily failed to hire. The court acknowledged the general
principle that "men do not have standing to bring claims of sex
discrimination under Title VII," but subsequently noted three exceptions to
the principle: "a cause of action may lie under Title VII if male employees
are subjected to discrimination 'because they are men,' . . . if discrimination
directed at women results in a loss of interpersonal contacts or associational
rights with women," or "if sex-based discrimination results in pecuniary
injury to both male and female workers."1 79
Recognizing its own history of interpreting the statutory language,
"person claiming to be aggrieved," as implying "a Congressional intent to
be liberal in allowing suits that effectuate the purposes of anti-
discrimination statutes,"'  the court held that the males had standing to sue
under Title VII.18  More generally, it held that "indirect victims of sex-
176. Posting of Professor Michael Zimmer to Conflicting Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/1 1/ricci-color-blind-standards-in-a-race-
conscious-society.html (Nov. 20, 2009, 8:49 CST).
177. Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 1999).
178. See generally id.
179. Id. at 89.
180. Id. at 91 (citing Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1240-
45 (3d Cir. 1978) (permitting a male plaintiff, alleging that he was discharged for failing to adhere
to a company policy of gender discrimination against women, to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(2006))).
181. Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92.
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based discrimination have standing to assert claims under Title VII if they
allege colorable claims of injury-in-fact that are fairly traceable to acts or
omissions by defendants that are unlawful under the statute." 82 Moreover,
in dicta, it added that "where the alleged harm is pecuniary, a Title VII
action should be characterized as involving direct discrimination, as
opposed to indirect discrimination, even if the plaintiffs were not the
objects of bias in the first instance."'' 83
Similarly, in Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc.,184 employees
alleged that the defendants had closed the plant due to sex discrimination in
light of the fact that the employee population was predominantly female. 185
Five of the fifty-one plaintiffs were males. 186 The court found that
the scope of the language "person aggrieved" confers standing to all
persons injured by an unlawful employment practice. These male
plaintiffs allege such an injury, and thus have standing. This is as it
should be. These males suffered the same injury as did the females
that lost their jobs; the injuries of the males and females were
occasioned by the same corporate decision; and if, as the plaintiffs
allege, considerations of sex motivated the corporate decision to close
the LaPorte plant, the corporate decision that injured the male
plaintiffs constituted an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII. 
18 7
In the 1988 case of Pennsylvania Nurses Association v.
Pennsylvania,'88 the issue of standing arose when a class of nurses alleging
gender discrimination against females with respect to retirement and
workmen's compensation benefits turned out to have four named male
plaintiffs. The court noted that, because the males had alleged that they
were provided with "inferior retirement benefits and workmens'
compensation coverage to plaintiffs due to the fact that the profession
which plaintiffs practice is traditionally female-dominated," it was the case
that "the male plaintiffs have been aggrieved by the sex-based
discrimination directed toward the female plaintiffs," and "the injury
suffered by the male plaintiffs confers standing on them to assert the instant
182. Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 92 (3d Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 92 n.26.
184. Allen v. Am. Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
185. Id. at 1554-55.
186. Id. at 1555.
187. Id. at 1557.




Title V11 claim." 189
None of these cases was addressed or cited in Ricci; the issue of
whether actionable disparate treatment, whether excused or not, has
occurred was never raised; rather, the fact was assumed. However, in lower
court cases with factual scenarios paralleling Ricci's, standing was not said
to exist for those outside of the group being discriminated against, such that
they could sue for disparate treatment under Title VII.
In Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 19 the Ninth Circuit
held that male plaintiffs who complained of sex discrimination, alleging
that, as part of a group which was predominantly female, they received less
compensation than they should have, lacked standing to allege sex-based
wage discrimination against women. 91  The court refused to apply
Trafficante, asserting that the case "address[ed] the harmful impact on the
plaintiff because of the denial of association with members of other
groups. ' 92 In contrast, the court found in the case before it that the
male employees do not claim that they have been denied interpersonal
contacts with women or that the alleged sex-based wages
discrimination has deprived them of harmonious relationships. In fact,
most of their co-workers are women. The serious consequences that
flow from the exclusion of persons because of discrimination in
housing and in hiring are not present here.
93
In fact, the court noted, "The male workers do not claim that they have been
discriminated against because they are men .... [T]he male workers cannot
assert the right of their female co-workers to be free from discrimination
based on their sex.
' 9 4
Similarly, in Spaulding v. University of Washington,195 a male plaintiff
who was employed alongside females as a member of the University's
nursing faculty alleged that he was discriminated against with regard to his
compensation due to sex-based discrimination directed against the women
with whom he taught. 196 The Ninth Circuit, however, found that because he
could not claim that he was compensated less because of his sex, he could
189. Pa. Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, No. 86-1586, 1991 WL 120200 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
1988).
190. Patee v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
191. See generally id.
192. Id. at 478.
193. Id. at 479.
194. Id. at 478.
195. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
196. Id. at 709.
[Vol. 55
Transferred Intent in Title VII
not "bootstrap" his claim onto that of the women's.' 97
In AFSCME v. County of Nassau,198 the court considered the issue of
standing in the context of two male plaintiffs in a proposed class of those
claiming to have worked in and been harmed economically by working in
"traditionally female jobs," and being underpaid. 199 Arguing that "although
they are men .... they are victims of the defendants' discrimination against
women,"'20 the plaintiffs were denied standing nonetheless:
It has oft been held that associational rights give rise to cognizable title
VII claims .... That is to say, if Goldberg and Jordan alleged "that
they have been denied interpersonal contacts with women," . . . they
would state a claim under title VII. But, "[i]n fact, most of their co-
workers are women.". . . They contend that they are aggrieved persons
because, but for the defendants' alleged discrimination against women,
they would be paid more. Goldberg and Jordan unquestionably "assert
their own injuries" and "their own rights."20 1
This meant, the court found, "that these injuries and rights do not
place them within the [T]itle VII zone of interests, because '[t]he male
workers do not claim that they have been discriminated against because
they are men."' 20 2 The court explained that "[w]hile there is considerable
appeal in [the] reasoning that 'the injuries of the males and females were
occasioned by the same ... decision,' . . . the fact remains that Goldberg
203
and Jordan suffer no injury qua men 3, and concluded that "the absence of
injury to the men as men is a fatal flaw for [T]itle VII purposes. 2 4
Furthermore, the court noted the irony in the plaintiffs' having been
given "standing to assert associational rights while lacking standing to
197. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Ruffin v. County of
L.A., 607 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The County's past employment practices as to its
deputy-sheriffs, however ill-conceived, did not serve as a foundation for this suit brought under
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.")).
198. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. County of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
199. Id. at 66-67.
200. Id. at 66.
201. Id. (citing Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1982)).
202. Id.; see also Patee v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Male
workers cannot assert the right of their female co-workers to be free from discrimination based on
their sex."); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[A] male faculty
member cannot bootstrap job grievance[s] into [a] Title VII claim, even where female faculty
members have [a] cognizable claim.").
203. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 664 F. Supp. at 66-67.




assert pecuniary rights." The court explained that:
As a matter of public policy, it is perhaps strange that a plaintiff may
come to federal court with a complaint that he is losing associational
benefits which are hard to quantify, while he is barred from
complaining of a loss of easily quantifiable dollars. Title VII,
however, focuses on whether the plaintiff suffers discrimination
because of who he is. Thus, the plaintiffs in Stewart and Waters, who
had standing, were denied the benefits of associating with members of
minority groups because those plaintiffs were white. Goldberg and
Jordan, in contrast, do not contend that they are underpaid because
they are men. To the contrary, they allege that they are men who are
being mistreated because they are being treated like women. As such,
they have not stated a claim under Title VII. Should this be bad public
policy, the remedy is with Congress. In accordance with the reasoning
in Patee, the court dismisses the [T]itle VII claims of Goldberg and
Jordan.20 6
It is thus clear that while a split existed among courts as to how to
frame, conceptualize, and adjudicate cases like Ricci, Ricci never
acknowledged these cases or any jurisdictional or other obstacle before it
found that all of plaintiffs had been the victims of presumptively unlawful
disparate treatment. The notion that the city's alleged intent to discriminate
based on race would "transfer" to each plaintiff regardless of his race was
simply accepted as the case's premise.
It will be interesting to see what the ramifications of this wrinkle of
the holding in Ricci will be, both in terms of how it may be used as
precedent, and whether this potential use was ever intended by the Court.
One potentially unintended ramification of the decision in Ricci would
manifest itself if members of classes not suffering discrimination in a
workplace could demonstrate that, for example, where a certain number of
people needed to be let go or demoted, and even a single individual was
informally discussed in terms of his or her protected class status ("Sheila's
on maternity leave and expecting to come back from leave into her same
job" or "If we demote Bob along with the others, we won't have any
African American managers,") and subsequently spared.
Under Ricci, a Caucasian person who was let go along with many
others and whose race was not a factor in the decision at all could
potentially show so much as protected class consciousness or awareness in
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a decision, and, resultantly, establish Title VII liability. This could severely
undermine or actually thwart Title VII's plain language, legislative intent,
and established jurisprudence. Relatively few decisions surrounding
layoffs, reductions in force, etcetera are made with absolutely no
consciousness as to protected class status. The potential for any such
considerations to be construed by a court as "race (or some other protected
class) conscious" or "race or protected class cognizant," and thus, illicit,
should be viewed as dangerous. This possible ramification of the decision
in Ricci should certainly raise some concern, or at least some further
discussion.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the holding and language in the Ricci case, the U.S. Supreme
Court looks to have formally endorsed what might come to be called a
"transferred intent" theory of proceeding under Title VII, whereby a
plaintiff need not show that her race motivated the act or decision at issue-
or that it was even contemplated by the decision makers. It also looks to
have resolved a split among courts that spans decades and numerous factual
iterations, but boils down to the question of Title VII's intended reach and
potentially unintended consequences.
On one hand, as the Court has observed before, the language of Title
VII "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment,"' 20 7 thus rendering its remedial goals broad-based. On
the other hand, however, the statute's plain language dictates that to run
afoul of Title VII's mandates, a defendant must "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race... .,,208
Whereas the Supreme Court looks to have resolved a split as to the
reach of Title VII that has spanned both time and geography, it is
fascinating that it looks to have done so implicitly and almost inadvertently.
The sudden injection of the principle of transferred intent into Title VII
jurisprudence needs to be recognized, contemplated, and weighed, as do its
consequences, as the law in this area moves forward.
207. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (citing L.A. Dept. of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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